What changed,
when.

v0.9.9

• In strict enrolment mode, a request that asks for application permissions in its enrolment credential is now rejected — those permissions belong on authorization tickets, not the enrolment credential.

v0.9.8

• Enrolment credentials now carry only the enrolment permission; application permissions (CAM, DENM, …) are granted on authorization tickets, matching the C-ITS trust model. Authorization validates each ticket's permissions against the operator policy.

v0.9.7

• Enrolment now checks the requested validity period: a request whose lifetime exceeds the maximum, or whose window falls outside the issuer's certificate validity, is rejected instead of silently adjusted.

v0.9.6

• An enrolment request from a station that is not registered now returns an "unknown station" response instead of a signature error, matching the conformance test expectations.

v0.9.5

• Authorization now grants a ticket only for permissions its enrolment credential already carries — requests asking for more are refused.
• Refused enrolment and authorization requests now return an encrypted response with the proper reason code (invalid signature, denied permissions, unknown EA) instead of a plain transport error.

v0.9.4

• Encrypted requests now identify the recipient by its certificate hash as the standard requires, restoring interoperability with third-party European PKI vendors.

v0.9.3

• Trust lists are now self-contained — CTL and ECTL embed the issuer certificate in their signature, matching EU production practice. CRL keeps its compact digest form.
• Misbehaviour reports are accepted in both the current and the legacy report format, with automatic version detection; the standard upload endpoints now require a decodable report.

v0.9.2

• The public /conformance audit now checks SSP bitmask consistency across the whole certificate chain, not just PSID sets — known findings are listed transparently with their scheduled fix.
• Enrolment and authorization activity is visible again in the public audit log and metrics counters (pseudonyms only).

v0.9.1

• Verified misbehaviour reports now feed a reaction pipeline — repeat offenders identified from report evidence are flagged as revocation candidates for authority review.

v0.9.0

• Misbehaviour reports are now cryptographically verified — reporter signature, MR permission and ticket validity are checked; forged or unauthorized reports are rejected.
• New standard upload endpoints POST /uploadMR-v1, /uploadMR-v1/Signed and /uploadMR-v1/SignedAndEncrypted (empty-body success responses); POST /mr stays as the rich debug API.
• Authorization Tickets now carry the Misbehaviour Reporting permission — the full certificate hierarchy was regenerated, fetch the new trust anchor from /trustanchor.

v0.8.9

• Canonical pubkey registry now multi-curve — Brainpool P-256r1 and P-384r1 accepted for initial enrolment and admin registration.

v0.8.8

• Brainpool curve CHOICE tag now preserved through EC and AT request parsing — enrolment with brainpool-p256r1 and brainpool-p384r1 works.
• keyTag HMAC uses correct CHOICE tag for Brainpool keys — AT request no longer rejected on tag mismatch.
• New debug endpoint POST /v221/ec-request-decode — decrypts and parses EC request, returns JSON with CHOICE tags.

v0.8.7

• SCMS decoder now rejects wire that is not a valid ScmsPdu, preventing silent false-positive decodes.

v0.8.6

• TLM Link Certificate endpoint exposed; serves the link blob when rotation occurs.

v0.8.5

• EaEntry now populates the ITS-Station access URL in its proper slot.

v0.8.4

• Content-type and version mismatches now return encrypted responses with proper codes.
• Client requests with privileged fields rejected.
• /capabilities documents authorization modes.

v0.8.3

• Request handlers reject out-of-window generationTime (default ±5 min).
• EC request idempotency cache: identical bodies return the same EC.
• Delta ECTL endpoint /getdeltaectl/{hid8}/{seq}.

v0.8.2

• /getectl now serves application/octet-stream per CPOC profile.

v0.8.1

• AT and EC fall back to a sensible default validity when the client omits it.
• TLM cert also served at /gettlmcertificate (no HID8) for blind bootstrap.

v0.8.0

• Wire decoder hardened: signed envelopes, ECIES, AT path.

v0.7.12

• AT proof-of-possession now validated by signature alone; removed brittle byte-exact hash recompute.

v0.7.11

• ECIES decoder accepts all curve-point CHOICE variants (compressed and uncompressed) for the ephemeral key.
• AT response codes propagate the actual validation cause instead of a generic "not the recipient".

v0.7.10

• Signed envelope decoder now accepts external-payload form (used by the AT proof-of-possession).

v0.7.9

• AT request: ecSignature now routed to the EA validator instead of being decrypted at the AA.

v0.7.8

• AT keyTag HMAC input is now the OER-encoded public keys instead of raw bytes.

v0.7.7

• AT response codes aligned with spec enumeration (fix 500 on error paths).

v0.7.6

• PKI signed envelopes now use the correct PSID; previous default was a different service.

v0.7.5

• EC outer signed verified against registered canonical pubkey; /admin/register accepts pubkey.
• AT request accepts both simple and outer-PoP variants.

v0.7.4

• EnrolmentRequest: outer signed envelope now verified.

v0.7.3

• JRC L0 profile aliases: /gettlmcertificate/{hid8} and /getectl/{hid8} with application/octet-stream.

v0.7.2

• ECIES p1 (KDF input) aligned with spec: p1 = SHA-256(recipient certificate).

v0.7.1

• RCA-CTL EA/AA/DC access points now use the configured public base URL.

v0.7.0

• RCA, TLM, EA, AA and MA CertificateIDs aligned with CPOC Protocol Release 3.2 §I.3.2.2 naming format.
• certIssuePermissions emit explicit bitmapSspRange per service (CPOC §I.3.7–3.8) instead of sspRange.all.
• AT pool, AA and RCA certIssue extended with PSID 1619 (POIM, TS 103 916) and PSID 145 (MCM, provisional placeholder).

v0.6.0

• Delta CRL endpoint, sequence-based incremental (TS 102 941).

v0.5.0

• Misbehaviour Report envelope parsed end-to-end (TS 103 759).
• Reporter AT pseudonym extracted and recorded; PSID checked against MR Service (1618).

v0.4.0

• AT validity capped at one week for Itss_WithPrivacy (C-ITS CP v3.0).

v0.3.1

• Implicit certificate reconstruction (TS 103 097 v2.1.1 §6 · ECQV).

v0.3.0

• Canonical ITS-AID registry per ETSI TS 102 965 v2.2.1.
• Curve-aware digest dispatch per TS 103 097.

v0.1.x

Initial public launch

• TLM separated from Root CA; ECTL signed by TLM.
• Misbehaviour Authority factory per TS 103 759.
• Multi-curve: NIST P-256, Brainpool P-256r1, Brainpool P-384r1.
• Wire: TS 102 941 Annex C OER · ECIES per IEEE 1609.2, strict.
• Bidirectional secured interop against an independent V2X stack.